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Lawrence and Same-Sex Marriage
Bans
ON CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND
SOPHISTICAL RHETORIC
Mark Strassert
I. INTRODUCTION
In Lawrence v. Texas,' the United States Supreme Court
struck down Texas's sodomy law. The majority carefully made
clear that it was not deciding whether the right to marry a
same-sex partner was constitutionally protected, but instead
was focusing on the criminal aspects of the prohibition at issue.
Justice Scalia implied in dissent that the Court had abandoned
principled constitutional interpretation and might well
eventually recognize the right of same-sex couples to marry.
While the Court is unlikely to recognize such a right in the
near future, the right of same-sex couples to marry follows
from the right-to-marry jurisprudence existing prior to
Lawrence. Lawrence is important not because it recognized a
right to same-sex marriage but because it overruled a decision
that had falsely been thought to bar the right to marry a same-
sex partner. This Article examines Lawrence in light of
McLaughlin v. Florida,' Loving v. Virginia,4 and the right-to-
© 2004 Mark Strasser. All Rights Reserved.
Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus,
Ohio.
1 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) [hereinafter Lawrence].
2 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) [hereinafter Bowers].
' 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
4 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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marry jurisprudence more generally, concluding that Lawrence
makes even clearer that the Constitution protects same-sex
marriage, even if the current Court is unlikely to recognize
that.
Part II of this Article examines Lawrence, contrasting it
with Bowers v. Hardwick' and discussing what Lawrence says
and does not say about the right to marry a same-sex partner.
This part ultimately concludes that although Lawrence
undermines the argument against gay marriage, it does not
expressly recognize that right. Part III examines the
jurisprudence existing prior to Lawrence. It discusses the equal
protection and due process issues implicated by same-sex
marriage bans, suggesting that such prohibitions should be
struck down on both due process and equal protection grounds.
Part IV explains why Lawrence might be thought to involve
"marriage," notwithstanding the explicit refusal of the
Lawrence majority to address that issue. The Article concludes
by suggesting that although same-sex marriage bans violate
both equal protection and due process guarantees, it is at best
unclear whether this Court will recognize what the
Constitution requires in this regard or whether, instead, that
recognition will not take place until sometime in the perhaps
distant future.
II. LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
In Lawrence v. Texas,' the plaintiffs challenged a statute
that criminalized intimate, same-sex conduct as a violation of
both the equal protection and due process guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment,' and the Court struck it down as a
violation of the latter.! The decision is likely to be viewed as a
watershed in the movement to secure equal rights for the
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered (LGBT) community,
although commentators will long disagree about what the
decision means and why it is important."
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
6 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
7 123 S. Ct. at 2475.
' Id. at 2476.
' See id. at 2476, 2484.
Compare Richard G. Wilkins, The Constitutionality of Legal Preferences for
Heterosexual Marriage, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 121, 122 (2003) (asserting that Lawrence
has little if any impact with respect to whether same-sex marriage is constitutionally
protected), with The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading Cases: I. Constitutional Law,
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A. Lawrence as Response to Bowers v. Hardwick
One way to understand Lawrence v. Texas is as a
substantive and symbolic response to Bowers v. Hardwick."
Lawrence removes some of the underpinnings provided by
Bowers upon which discrimination against the LGBT
community has been rationalized. At the same time, it
recognizes the dignity of same-sex relationships and offers hope
that the LGBT community will someday enjoy the same rights
that others in the United States enjoy.
At issue in Lawrence was Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
21.06(a), which prohibited sexual relations between members
of the same sex involving contact between the genitals of one
person and the mouth or anus of another, or the penetration of
the genitals or the anus of another person with an object." The
state did not criminalize the same activities if performed by
members of different sexes.'3
While the Court ultimately struck down the statute as a
violation of Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees,"
the Court seemed to take the equal protection challenge
seriously as well, describing that argument as "tenable.""5
However, the Court believed it very important to address
Bowers directly,'6 since "[ilts continuance as precedent demeans
the lives of homosexual persons.""
The dispute in Bowers concerned a Georgia statute that
prohibited sexual acts "involving the sex organs of one person
and the mouth or anus of another."" The statute did not
distinguish based on either the sexes of the parties involved or
their marital status.' Indeed, initially, a married couple as well
2. Intimate Personal Relationships, 117 HARv. L. REV. 297, 298 (2003) (asserting that
after Lawrence, same-sex marriage bans will only be upheld if narrowly tailored to
promote compelling state interests).
1 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
1 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2476.
13 See id. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
14 See id. at 2476, 2484.
5 Id. at 2482.
16 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
17 Id.
18 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.1.
'9 See id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The sex or status of the persons
who engage in the act is irrelevant as a matter of state law.").
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as Hardwick challenged the statute,"0 although the couple was
dismissed for lack of standing.2
Hardwick challenged the statute as a violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 The
Bowers Court understood that an existing line of cases
protected the right of privacy" and, further, that some of the
right of privacy cases recognized rights that "have little or no
textual support in the constitutional language."" The Court
claimed, however, that it could "identify the nature of the
rights qualifying for heightened judicial protection,"2 namely,
those "liberties that are 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' such that 'neither liberty not justice would exist if
[they] were sacrificed,'3 6 or "those liberties that are 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' 27 The Court
concluded that because "neither of these formulations would
extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of
consensual sodomy,"28 the right to privacy did not include the
right to engage in same-sex relations.
Yet the Court failed to point out that those rights
already recognized as falling within the right to privacy also
would not have met the test articulated by the Court. For
example, the statute at issue in Griswold v. Connecticut,'
which prohibited using "any drug, medicinal article or
instrument for the purpose of preventing contraception," ° had
been on the books for over eighty years;" thus the right to use
contraception could not plausibly have been described as either
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or deeply rooted in
this nation's history and tradition. The statute prohibiting
abortion at issue in Roe v. Wade" typified statutes that had
20 See id. at 188 n.2.
21 See id.
22 Id. at 189.
23 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
24 Id. at 191.
25 id.
26 Id. at 191-92 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)).
27 Id. at 192 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977)).
28 Id.
2 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
30 See id. at 480.
3, See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961) ("The Connecticut law
prohibiting the use of contraceptives has been on the State's books since 1879.").
32 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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been on the books for a century;33 thus the right to abort could
hardly be thought deeply rooted in the nation's history and
tradition." The point here is not to suggest that Griswold and
Roe were wrongly decided but merely to suggest that the Court
offered the wrong test in Bowers for determining whether
something falls within the constitutional right to privacy.
The Bowers Court at least implicitly offered another test
for determining whether a particular liberty falls within the
right to privacy, construing the protected zone as involving
family-related decisions and then suggesting that "[n]o
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one
hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated.""5 The Lawrence Court accepted that family-
related decisions are within that protected zone, reaffirming
that "our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education."" However, the Lawrence Court differed from the
Bowers Court in recognizing that same-sex couples can and do
have relationships worthy of protection. Indeed, the Lawrence
Court criticized the Bowers Court by noting that the latter had
mischaracterized the relevant issue: "To say that the issue in
Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as
it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage
is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.""7 The
Lawrence Court noted that "[wihen sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring,"" thereby recognizing that same-sex couples, like
different-sex couples, may not merely perform isolated sexual
acts but may have relationships in which they find meaning,
purpose, and dignity. 9
33 See id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
34 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2493 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Roe v. Wade Court had not even attempted to establish that a right to abortion was
deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition).
35 Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
36 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
37 Id. at 2478.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 2482.
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The Lawrence Court outlined some of the pernicious
effects of Bowers, explaining that "[wihen homosexual conduct
is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in
and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.""
As the Court noted, "Indeed, Texas itself previously
acknowledged the collateral effects of the law, stipulating...
that the law 'legally sanctions discrimination against
[homosexuals] in a variety of ways unrelated to the criminal
law,' including in the areas of 'employment, family issues, and
housing.'"' As an additional point, the Court noted some of the
direct and significant effects of a conviction under the statute.42
For example, as Justice O'Connor noted in her concurring
opinion, a conviction would restrict the ability of an individual
to pursue various professions in Texas and might require that
individual to register as a sex offender were he or she to move
to another state."
In overruling Bowers, the Lawrence Court prevented the
imposition of some of the harms outlined above and
undermined the purported justification for others. Thus, not
only may a state no longer seek a conviction under sodomy
laws in circumstances like these, but those who once justified
discrimination against the LGBT community by arguing that
adult, consensual sodomitical relations could be criminalized
must now offer another ground upon which to rationalize their
desired discrimination.
A separate but related point is that individuals who
wish to deny equal rights to members of the LGBT community
can no longer support their position by pointing to the Court's
tone when addressing sexual orientation issues." Some of the
harm Bowers caused was not a result of its substantive holding
but rather its tone, which might felicitously be described as
40 Id.
" See id. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing State v. Morales, 826
S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. App. 1992).
42 Id. at 2482.
13 See id. at 2485-86 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
" Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), also adopted a different tone,
although the Court's denial of certiorari in Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati,
Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 525 U.S. 943 (1998), made Romer somewhat difficult to
interpret since the language of the referendum proposition in Equality Foundation bore
a strong resemblance to the language in the referendum proposition in Romer, which
the Court held violated constitutional guarantees. 525 U.S. at 943-44 n.2; 517 U.S. at
624.
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contemptuous towards those with a same-sex orientation." By
contrast, the Lawrence Court showed respect rather than
contempt, acknowledging that "adults may choose to enter
upon this [same-sex] relationship in the confines of their homes
and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free
persons."46 While hardly offering a full-fledged endorsement,
the Court nonetheless accords a kind of respectability to LGBT
people and relationships not accorded in previous decisions.
The Lawrence Court addressed the concern that some
view sodomitical behavior as violating religious and moral
principles, discussing "powerful voices . . [that] condemn
homosexual conduct as immoral."'7 The Court understood that
such views were "shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of
right and acceptable behavior, and respect for traditional
family,"8 but noted that "the issue is whether the majority may
use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole
society through operation of the criminal law. " " Concluding
that the majority may not, the Court struck down the statute.'
Of course, Lawrence also has implications for those not
in the LGBT community. By holding that the Due Process
Clause protects sodomy, the Lawrence Court is presumably
invalidating any fornication statues remaining on the books."' A
separate question is whether statutes prohibiting adultery or
prostitution are also at risk,2 although the majority made clear
that the case before it did not involve prostitution" and offered
language suggesting how the case before it might be
distinguished from one involving adultery.' Thus, state statues
" See Neill v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044, 1066 (10th Cir. 2001) (Lucero, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the Bowers Court's contempt towards lesbians and gays);
Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1453 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting),
superceded by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn on reh'g by 875 F.2d 699 (9th
Cir. 1989) ("[Tlhe anti-homosexual thrust of Hardwick, and the Court's willingness to
condone anti-homosexual animus in the actions of the government, are clear.").
46 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478.
47 Id. at 2480.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 See id. at 2484.
51 See D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1602 (2004) (up to six months or $300 for
committing fornication); IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (Michie 2004) (same).
52 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2490 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
52 See id. at 2484.
54 See id. at 2478 (suggesting that the state should not set boundaries on
relationships "absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects").
For a discussion of adultery as an abuse of marriage, see City of Sherman v. Henry,
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regulating sexual conduct may now have to undergo
reexamination, with some being quite vulnerable to
constitutional challenge but others being quite likely to
withstand an attack on federal constitutional grounds.
Further, a more general point might be made about how
the Due Process Clause may be construed in the future. The
Lawrence Court eschewed the Bowers history-and-traditions
approach and instead suggested that "those who drew and
ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment [and]
the Fourteenth Amendment ... [understood that] times can
blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that
laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
oppress."" The Court understood that this would mean that
challenges that might once have been dismissed out of hand by
one generation might well be taken seriously by another, and
noted that "[a]s the Constitution endures, persons in every
generation can invoke its principles in their own search for
greater freedom."' Here, the Lawrence Court demonstrates
that it rejects the static approach to due process analysis,
leaving open the possibility that a variety of liberties once
considered appropriately subject to state regulation may now
be constitutionally protected.
B. Lawrence and the Right to Marry a Same-Sex Partner
Commentators discussing whether the United States
Constitution protects the right of same-sex couples to marry
will debate both whether and why Lawrence plays an
important role in that analysis. Although Justice Scalia
suggested in his Lawrence dissent that the decision provides
the basis for recognizing same-sex marriage, 7 there are a
number of reasons to doubt that the Court is ready to take this
step. Lawrence mentions or alludes to same-sex marriage in
several places." However, nowhere in the opinion is there a
suggestion that members of the Court believe the Constitution
protects such a right. Moreover, the opinion does contain
928 S.W.2d 464, 470 (Tex. 1996) ("Adultery by its very nature undermines the marital
relationship and often rips apart families.").
" Id. at 2484.
56 Id.
57 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 2478; id. at 2487-88 (O' Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2490, 2495-98
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 69:31010
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evidence in several places that some members of the Court do
not believe the right is protected.
The majority opinion alludes to same-sex unions but
refuses to express an opinion about their constitutional status.
For example, the Court noted that the Texas criminal statute
seeks to "control a personal relationship that, whether or not
entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of
persons to choose without being punished as criminals."" Thus,
some members of the Court may believe that the Constitution
precludes criminalizing voluntary, adult, same-sex relations
but does not also require that same-sex unions be given legal
recognition. Certainly, this seems to be the view that Justice
O'Connor now holds, ' and it is simply unclear how many other
members of the Court share that view.
The Lawrence majority offered a general rule that states
should not attempt to set boundaries on relationships "absent
injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects."'
The Court did not clarify what it had in mind when discussing
abuse of a legally protected institution. Perhaps the Court was
thinking of marriage and was suggesting that adulterous
relationships are not protected by the right to privacy because
they tend to undermine marriages. 2 Or, perhaps the Court was
suggesting that recognizing same-sex marriage would involve
an abuse of the institution of marriage, notwithstanding that
other countries permit such unions to be celebrated.'
The Lawrence Court made quite clear that the case
before it did "not involve whether the government must give
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons
seek to enter."" That said, however, the Court did offer some
59 Id. at 2478.
60 See id. at 2484 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Texas' statute banning same-
sex sodomy is unconstitutional.").
That this law as applied to private, consensual conduct is unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause does not mean that other laws
distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals would similarly fail
under rational basis review. Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest
here, such as national security or preserving the traditional institution of
marriage.
Id. at 2487-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
61 Id. at 2478.
62 See supra note 54.
0 See Michael Paulson, Vatican Warns on Same-Sex Marriage Broad Edict
Has Message for Catholic Politicians, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 2003, at Al (noting that
Belgium and the Netherlands recognize same-sex marriage and that such marriages
have been recognized in Ontario and British Columbia, Canada).
CA Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
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very encouraging language in the opinion. For example, the
Court noted that when "homosexual conduct is made criminal
by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an
invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both
in the public and in the private spheres."' The same point
might be made about refusing to recognize same-sex marriages
- such a policy is an invitation to discriminate because it says
that same-sex couples are somehow unworthy. Indeed, if, as
the Court said in Romer v. Evans,' an act is unconstitutional
when it "classifies homosexuals not to further a proper
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else,"'
and, as Justice Scalia suggests in his Lawrence dissent,
"'preserving the traditional institution of marriage' is just a
kinder way of describing the State's moral disapproval of same-
sex couples,"' then one might expect the Court to recognize the
unconstitutionality of same-sex marriage bans.
In criticizing Bowers, the Lawrence Court noted that the
"longstanding criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy upon
which the Bowers decision placed such reliance is as consistent
with a general condemnation of nonprocreative sex as it is with
an established tradition of prosecuting acts because of their
homosexual character."' The Court thereby tried to undercut
the suggestion that traditionally the law had intentionally and
specifically imposed unique disabilities on the LGBT
community, although one might nonetheless point out that
laws aimed generally at nonprocreative acts have been used to
justify the imposition of special burdens on those with a same-
sex orientation. For example, the law upheld in Bowers was not
aimed at the LGBT community in particular,' but some
claimed that the Court's decision in that case justified imposing
unique disabilities on that community." It is worth noting that
an analogous approach has been used to justify same-sex
marriage bans. The inability of same-sex couples to have a
child through their union has been cited as a reason not to
65 Id. at 2482.
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
67 Id. at 635.
6' Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 2479.
70 See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 200 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The sex
or status of the persons who engage in the act is irrelevant as a matter of state law.").
7, See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Bowers
justifies the imposition of unique disabilities on those with a same-sex orientation).
[Vol. 69:31012
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allow them to marry,2 even though others unable to have
children are not similarly precluded from marrying.
Lawrence suggests that the Court will look askance at
state attempts to impose a disability on one group and not
another if the groups are similarly situated. As Justice Scalia
suggests in his dissent, the nonprocreation argument is not a
plausible rationale for precluding same-sex couples from
marrying, given that the sterile and elderly are allowed to
marry.73 Indeed, it is even more implausible than Justice Scalia
seems willing to admit. Given that LGBT couples are having
and raising children," the procreation argument supports
rather than undermines the claim that same-sex couples
should be allowed to marry.
While some of the language and reasoning of the
Lawrence opinion is very promising, the decision cannot be
cited for the proposition that the Constitution protects same-
sex marriage. The members of the Court have been careful
either to express no opinion on this subject or to suggest that
there is no constitutional right to marry a same-sex partner.
Given that Lawrence leaves open rather than decides this
issue, it may be helpful to see whether a case can be made from
the jurisprudence existing prior to Lawrence for a
constitutionally protected right to marry a same-sex partner.
III. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The right-to-marry jurisprudence has been evolving
since the Court in Loving v. Virginia"5 described it as "one of
the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men."" The Court has recognized the right's
importance, both for society as a whole and for the individuals
themselves. One key question, then, is whether same-sex
71 See Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (C.D. Cal 1980) ("[Ihf
propagation of the race is basic to the concept of marriage and its legal attributes,
'marriage' is again impossible and unthinkable between persons of the same sex.").
73 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74 See Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 964 (Mass. 2003)
("In this case, we are confronted with an entire, sizeable class of parents raising
children who have absolutely no access to civil marriage and its protections because
they are forbidden from procuring a marriage license."); Chuck Colbert, Gay Catholics
Refuse to Go Away or Be Quiet, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 31, 2000, at 3 (discussing Catholic
lesbian and gay baby boom).
75 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
76 Id. at 12.
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marriage would serve the individual and societal interests that
different-sex marriages serve.
A. Setting the Stage for Loving
In Loving, one of the most important marriage
decisions, the Court struck down anti-miscegenation laws in
Virginia." The Loving Court suggested that the laws violated
both equal protection78 and due process guarantees." Yet a mere
three years earlier in McLaughlin v. Florida,8 the Court had
been unwilling to express an opinion about the
constitutionality of interracial marriage bans.
In McLaughlin, the Court examined a Florida statute
making interracial fornication and adultery a separate crime."
The state justified its law as an attempt to "prevent breaches of
the basic concept of sexual decency."" While not quarrelling
with the state's contention that it had a legitimate interest in
preventing "illicit extramarital and premarital promiscuity,"83
the Court suggested that the state's purposes could be served
by statutes of "general application. "
The state of Florida offered another justification for the
statute, however, pointing to its interracial marriage ban and
arguing that its interracial cohabitation law was "ancillary to
and serv[ing] the same purpose as the miscegenation law
itself."' The Court rejected this argument "without reaching
the question of the validity of the State's prohibition against
interracial marriage."" The Court noted that "even if we posit
the constitutionality of the ban against the marriage of a Negro
and a white, it does not follow that the cohabitation law is not
to be subjected to independent examination under the
Fourteenth Amendment.""7  The Court subjected the
77 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
78 See id. at 12 ("There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry
solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause.").
79 See id. ("These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due
process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
80 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
81 See id. at 184.
82 See id. at 193.
83 Id.
' Id. at 194.
"5 McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 195.
86 Id.
87 Id.
1014 [Vol. 69:3
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cohabitation law to this independent examination and found it
constitutionally wanting.
In McLaughlin, the Court did not strike down
cohabitation laws generally, but only those specifically directed
at interracial couples. In Lawrence, the Court struck down not
just laws criminalizing same-sex sodomy, but all sodomy laws."
It is simply unclear whether the Court will someday follow
Lawrence with a decision striking same-sex marriage
prohibitions as the Court followed McLaughlin with Loving.
However, the past constitutional jurisprudence has privileged
marital over non-marital relations and the Lawrence Court
suggests that adult, non-marital, consensual relations"9 are
protected. Unless the Court is going to invert the traditional
priorities and say that same-sex non-marital relations are
protected but that same-sex marriage is not, the holding in
Lawrence suggests that same-sex marriage may also be
protected by the right to privacy.
B. The Right to Privacy
In Lawrence, the Court suggested that Griswold v.
Connecticut' was "the most pertinent beginning point"" for an
analysis of the constitutionality of Texas's sodomy law. The
Court noted that Griswold struck down a Connecticut law
"prohibiting the use of drugs or devices of contraception" even
by married couples. 2 The Griswold Court had "described the
protected interest as a right to privacy and placed emphasis on
the marriage relation and the protected space of the marital
bedroom." 3 Of course, relying on marital privacy would not
seem to be of much help for those challenging Texas's sodomy
statute, given that the statute only applied to non-marital
relations." However, the Lawrence Court wrote that "[aifter
Griswold, it was established that the right to make certain
See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482 (2003) ("Were we to hold the statute
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might question whether a prohibition
would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex
and different-sex participants.").
89 There may well be an exception for adulterous relations. See supra note 62.
90 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
91 See Lawrence, 13 S. Ct. at 2476 (discussing Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
92 See id. at 2476.
93 See id. at 2477 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485).
94 Because same-sex couples are not allowed to marry in Texas, the
prohibited relations would presumably be performed by a non-marital couple. See TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. & 2.001 (Vernon 2003).
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decisions regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital
relationship."95 Here, the Court was presumably referring to
Eisenstadt v. Baird,' a case that the Court apparently read as
protecting not only the right of unmarried individuals to have
access to contraception but also to engage in sexual relations,"
at least if the individuals are adult and their relations are
consensual."
It may seem surprising that Justice Scalia did not focus
more on the first concurrence in Griswold, in which Justice
Goldberg wrote that "it should be said of the Court's holding
today that it in no way interferes with a State's proper
regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct,"" and in which
he and two other members of the Court" cited Justice Harlan's
dissent in Poe v. Ullman'° with approval.' In his Poe dissent,
Justice Harlan argued that the "right of privacy most
manifestly is not an absolute. Thus, I would not suggest that
adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune
from criminal enquiry, however privately practiced.""'
Yet there may well be a reason that Justice Scalia did
not focus on the Griswold concurrence and Poe dissent, which a
fuller discussion of Justice Harlan's analysis will bring to light.
Justice Harlan argued that the
laws regarding marriage which provide both when the sexual powers
may be used and the legal and societal context in which children are
born and brought up, as well as laws forbidding adultery, fornication
and homosexual practices which express the negative of the
proposition, confining sexuality to lawful marriage, form a pattern so
deeply pressed into the substance of our social life that any
Constitutional doctrine in this area must build upon that basis. 104
Here, it is clear that Justice Harlan was envisioning a
world in which same-sex relations did not occur within the
95 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477.
9 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
97 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477 (discussing Eisenstadt).
See id. at 2484 ("The present case does not involve minors. It does not
involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships
where consent might not easily be refused.").
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498-99 (1965) (Goldberg,
concurring).
100 Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren joined Goldberg's concurrence.
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
101 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
102 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499.
"' Poe, 367 U.S. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 546 (Harlan J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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context of a family setting but, instead, outside of one. Whether
that was an accurate picture at the time is unclear, but it
certainly is not accurate today, given various developments
over the past several decades. Same-sex couples are now living
together as families. '°5 Sometimes they raise children and
sometimes they do not, but in any case it simply is not true
that same-sex relations must take place outside of families
rather than within them. If the Due Process Clause
paradigmatically protects families, then it should also protect
LGBT families.
A further point might be noted. Justice Harlan
suggested that the constitutional doctrine that provides
bulwarks against state interference must begin with the
family. That does not suggest that the constitutional doctrine
must end there. Rather, Harlan offers a prioritization. Family
relationships must be protected even if sexual activity by those
outside of a family is not. However, that hardly means that the
latter cannot or should not also be protected.
The Lawrence Court noted, "When sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with another person, the
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more
enduring.". 6 Here, the Court recognizes that same-sex relations
may take place within the context of a relationship, and implies
that such relationships are included within the family
relationships protected under the Due Process Clause.
In his Poe dissent, Justice Harlan distinguished
between the state's "power either to forbid extra-marital
sexuality altogether, or to say who may marry" and the State's
power "when, having acknowledged a marriage and the
intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of
the criminal law the details of that intimacy."' ' Yet, it is not as
if the state has absolute discretion with respect to regulating
who may marry whom. As the Loving Court made clear a mere
six years later, state marital restrictions must not violate
constitutional guarantees.
One might think that Loving does very little to limit the
power of the states to decide who can marry and that the states
have free reign in this regard as long as they do not classify on
the basis of race. Such a view has not been borne out in the
'05 See Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
106 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2478 (2003).
107 Poe, 367 U.S. at 553 (Harlan J., dissenting).
20041 1017
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
subsequent jurisprudence. In Zablocki v. Redhail," the Court
examined a Wisconsin statute that precluded certain Wisconsin
residents from marrying without court permission."a The state
required courts to deny noncustodial parents permission to
marry unless they could show that they were meeting and
would continue to meet their child support obligations." °
Redhail, an indigent who wished to marry but who was unable
to pay court-ordered support for a child that he had fathered
out of wedlock, challenged the statute."'
The Zablocki Court noted that the "leading decision of
this Court on the right to marry is Loving v. Virginia,""' and
explained that "[a]lthough Loving arose in the context of racial
discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court
confirm that the right to marry is of fundamental importance
for all individuals."..3 The Court did not limit the class for
whom this right was so fundamental by excluding, for example,
those either unwilling or unable to have children or those with
a same-sex orientation, but said that it was important for
everyone. Indeed, Justice Powell in his Zablocki concurrence
suggested that the decision would have implications for those
with a same-sex orientation.'
The Zablocki Court did not merely announce that the
"right to marry is part of the fundamental 'right of privacy'
implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,""8
but instead tried to explain why that was so by putting it in the
context of those rights that had already been recognized as
falling within the right to privacy. The Court noted, "It is not
surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the
same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation,
childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships,""'. since "it
would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with
respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to
the decision to enter the relationship that is the foundation of
the family in our society.""7 While accepting that Wisconsin had
,08 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
,09 See id. at 375.
"o See id.
"' See id. at 378.
112 Id. at 383.
"' Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384.
,,4 Id. at 399 (Powell, J. concurring).
,,5 Id. at 384.
", Id. at 386.
117 Id.
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"legitimate and substantial interests" that the statute served,118
the Court nonetheless struck down the statute because "the
means selected by the State for achieving these interests
unnecessarily impinge on the right to marry.""'
Zablocki would seem to be very persuasive if not
dispositive in the context under discussion here, given that
LGBT couples are having and raising children.12° If, as Zablocki
states, it makes little sense to recognize a right of privacy with
respect to other matters of family life but not to marriage, then
it makes no sense to refuse to recognize the right of same-sex
couples to marry.
In Adams v. Howerton,"21 a federal district court
addressed the validity of a same-sex marriage between an
American and an Australian national. The court held that the
marriage was invalid even though marriages were "sanctioned
between couples who are sterile because of age or physical
infirmity, and between couples who make clear that they have
chosen not to have children.".22 The Adams court explained that
"if the classification of the group who may validly marry is
overinclusive, it does not affect the validity of the
classification. " " Yet the court failed to understand that this is
one of the reasons that same-sex marriages must be recognized
regardless of whether a particular same-sex couple plans to
have or raise children. Even were it true that the sole reason to
permit members of a class to marry was to enable them to
provide a more stable environment in which children might be
born and raised, that still would provide justification for
recognizing same-sex marriages. The interests implicated in
being able to provide a stable, marital home for children apply
to both same-sex and different-sex couples, and if those
interests ground the right of different-sex couples to marry,
they also should ground the right of same-sex couples to marry.
In Turner v. Safley" 4 the Court discussed some of the
constitutionally significant interests implicated in marriage.
Marriages are "expressions of emotional support and public
118 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388.
119 Id.
120 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
121 486 F. Supp 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
122 Id. at 1124.
123 Id.
124 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
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commitment.' 2' Furthermore, "the commitment of marriage
may be an exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of
personal dedication.'' Finally, marriage "often is a
precondition to the receipt of government benefits." 12 7 Given
that all of these interests are also implicated for same-sex
couples"a and the right to marry is of fundamental importance
for all individuals, the right to marry a same-sex partner
should be held to be constitutionally protected even bracketing
Lawrence.
Lawrence does add something to the debate, however. If,
as suggested in Bowers and reaffirmed in Lawrence, the central
focus of the substantive due process protections involve family-
related matters, such as marriage and having and raising
children, then one would expect that if sexual relations for
different-sex and same-sex couples are protected even when
occurring outside of the family context, then families comprised
of same-sex partners should certainly be protected. It may be
that Justice Scalia did not want to point to the prioritization
that the Court has adopted precisely because this would mean
that the existing jurisprudence protects same-sex marriage,
especially after Lawrence. Thus, the claim would not be that
same-sex marriage might be recognized because the Court has
given up all reasoning but rather that the Court's previous
jurisprudence compels the legal recognition of such unions.
Indeed, Justice Scalia admits as much when he suggests that
after Lawrence no distinction can "be made between
heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal
recognition in marriage is concerned."29
While Justice Scalia is correct that after Lawrence there
is no constitutionally viable distinction between the right to
marry a same- versus a different-sex partner, he is incorrect
insofar as he is implying that there was a constitutionally
viable distinction before Lawrence.'30 Even were the state
... Id. at 95.
126 Id. at 96.
127 Id.
'. Some religions recognize same-sex marriages. See Edward Brumby, Note,
What Is in a Name: Why the European Same-Sex Partnership Acts Create a Valid
Marital Relationship, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 145, 162 (1999) ("A growing number of
religions recognize same-sex relationships as a legitimate form of marriage.").
'29 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2498 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130 See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's opinion dismantles the structure of
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual
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permitted to criminalize sodomy outside of marriage, that
would not imply that it could criminalize sodomy within
marriage. ' Thus, even were Bowers still good law, that would
not imply that a same-sex couple who had married could be
prohibited from engaging in sexual relations. Nor would it
mean that the state could prevent same-sex couples from
marrying to prevent them from engaging in "criminal"
sodomitical acts. Nonetheless, now that Bowers has been
overruled, those specious arguments are no longer even
tempting to make.
C. Equal Protection
The argument above focuses on the substantive due
process protections provided by the Fourteenth Amendment. A
separate question is whether same-sex marriage bans violate
equal protection guarantees. The comments offered by Justices
O'Connor and Scalia in Lawrence suggest that at least four
members of the Court are unlikely to accept the equal
protection argument,3' although these comments also suggest
that the Court is going to have to modify its equal protection
jurisprudence in order to avoid striking down same-sex
marriage bans on that basis.
Justice O'Connor made clear in her concurrence that
she would have struck down the Texas statue on equal
protection rather than substantive due process grounds.'33 She
suggested that rational basis review itself has tiers. Because
"some objectives, such as 'a bare ... desire to harm a politically
unpopular group,' are not legitimate state interests,"" the
Court will apply "a more searching form of rational basis
review to strike down such laws under the Equal Protection
Clause."'' Under this more searching form of rational basis
review, the Texas statute could not pass constitutional muster.
and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.")
(emphasis added).
131 See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) ("[Ilndividual decisions by married
persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not
intended to produce offspring, are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
132 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas both joined Justice Scalia's
opinion. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13 Id. at 2484. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
13 Id. at 2485. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
,35 Id. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Justice O'Connor did not join the Court in overruling
Bowers." She suggested that the promotion of morality was a
rational basis for substantive due process purposes, 3 ' even if
not for equal protection purposes. She explained, "Moral
disapproval of this group [those with a same-sex orientation],
like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is
insufficient to satisfy the rational basis review under the Equal
Protection Clause.. 3 She thus would have struck down the
Texas statute but would have reserved for another day whether
the Due Process Clause precluded a neutral sodomy law."
Justice O'Connor recognized that because the Texas
sodomy statute criminalized conduct one might argue that it
did not discriminate against persons."'4 However, she reasoned
that the statute was "directed toward gay persons as a class '
and thus was unconstitutional. 4 ' Justice O'Connor noted,
however, that she would view a challenge to same-sex marriage
statutes somewhat differently. She suggested that "[ulnlike the
moral disapproval of same-sex relations - the asserted state
interest in this case - other reasons exist to promote the
institution of marriage beyond moral disapproval of an
excluded group."'" Justice O'Connor failed to elaborate what
those reasons might be, and the question to be answered at
some future time is whether, as Justice Scalia suggests,
"'preserving the traditional institution of marriage' is just a
kinder way of describing the State's moral disapproval of same-
sex couples. 44 If Justice Scalia is correct, then it may well be
very difficult indeed to provide any legitimate rationale for
same-sex marriage bans.
At least two points might be made about Justice
O'Connor's apparent willingness to uphold same-sex marriage
bans. First, the Wisconsin statute at issue in Zablocki was
'3 See id. at 2484 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
137 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2486 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
138 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139 See id. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Whether a sodomy law that is
neutral both in effect and application [citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)]
would violate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause is an issue that
need not be decided today.").
,40 See id. at 2485 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing Texas's claims).
141 Id. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
142 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
143 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
144 Id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 69:31022
LAWRENCE AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE BANS
struck down on equal protection grounds.' 5 There, the state
had legitimate and substantial reasons for its statute, "' which
nonetheless did not suffice to save it. The class of individuals
adversely affected by the statute - the indigent - was not
suspect or quasi-suspect.' 7 Thus, even if the state were to have
a legitimate reason for its same-sex marriage ban and was not
simply wishing to express its moral disapproval of same-sex
couples, it is not at all clear that the reason would suffice in
light of the existing jurisprudence.
Second, it is not at all clear that rational basis review
would be appropriate when examining this equal protection
challenge. Justice Scalia's comments in his Lawrence dissent
suggest why this is so, especially once his misleading analysis
of Loving is explained and a more accurate analysis is
considered in its stead. Justice Scalia recognized in his
Lawrence dissent that the Texas "statute does distinguish
between the sexes insofar as concerns the partner with whom
the sexual acts are performed: men can violate the law only
with other men, and women only with other women.' 4.
However, he concluded, "this cannot itself be a denial of equal
protection, since its is precisely the same distinction regarding
partner that is drawn in state laws prohibiting marriage with
someone of the same sex while permitting marriage with
someone of the opposite sex..' 4
Let us bracket his conclusion about whether the Texas
statute passes muster under the Equal Protection Clause,
especially since a majority of the Court seems to believe that it
failed to pass muster even under the rational basis test.'5 Let
us also bracket his conclusory statement about whether same-
sex marriage bans pass constitutional muster,'"' since that is
the matter at issue, and examine why he believes that
.4. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382 (1978).
146 See id. at 388.
141 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding
that poverty is not a suspect or quasi-suspect classification).
14" Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
'50 See id. at 2482 (describing the equal protection argument as "tenable"); id.
at 2484-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting the statute is unconstitutional on
equal protection grounds).
"'Justice Scalia suggests that the same-sex sodomy ban cannot be
unconstitutional because it incorporates the same distinction as the same-sex marriage
ban. See id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). His statement only makes sense if the
same-sex marriage ban does not pass muster, although he does not provide reasons to
support its constitutionality.
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heightened scrutiny would not be required when examining the
constitutionality of such statutes.
Justice Scalia realizes that both the Texas sodomy
statute and same-sex marriage bans ' facially discriminate on
the basis of sex, but argues that heightened scrutiny is not
necessary for either. He understands that the anti-
miscegenation laws at issue in Loving v. Virginia" would seem
to be a clear counter-example to his analysis of whether same-
sex marriage bans trigger heightened scrutiny, since the laws
at issue in Loving "similarly were applicable to whites and
blacks alike, and only distinguished between the races insofar
as the partner was concerned."'" However, he argues, the Court
in Loving "correctly applied heightened scrutiny, rather than
the usual rational-basis review, because the Virginia statute
was 'designed to maintain White Supremacy.
' '
7
5
5
Certainly, he is correct that the Loving Court found that
the statutes at issue were designed to promote white
supremacy." However, the important issues are whether closer
scrutiny was required to discover this invidious motivation and
what would have happened had there been no such finding.
Consider the Court's analysis in City of Richmond v. J. A.
Croson Co.'7 The Court explained, "Absent searching judicial
inquiry into ... race-based measures, there is simply no way of
determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and
what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate
notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics."'" While
some members of the Court have argued convincingly that it is
sometimes possible to distinguish between benign and
malicious discrimination, 9 the discrimination at issue in
Loving and, for that matter, at issue in same-sex marriage
152 For an example of such a ban, see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001 (Vernon
2003).
15 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
'54 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
... Id. at 2495 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 6, 11).
'5 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
157 488 U.S. 469 (1989) [hereinafter Croson].
'" Id. at 493.
,9 See Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is
designed to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial
subordination.").
[Vol. 69:31024
LAWRENCE AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE BANS
bans, can hardly be characterized as benign."n In any event,
one would not expect Justice Scalia to rely on the purpose of
the discriminator when deciding whether exacting scrutiny
should be employed for a racial classification.'6
Justice Scalia's analysis is even more misleading
because he mischaracterizes the Loving decision itself. The
Loving Court made clear that even had there been no purpose
to promote white supremacy, the anti-miscegenation statutes
still would have been struck down." Further, even had the
Loving Court not expressed this explicitly, the jurisprudence as
it has since developed requires that "all racial classifications,
imposed by whatever federal, state, or local actor, must be
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.""
The lesson of Loving is not that racial classifications
will be examined closely only when designed to promote white
supremacy, but that racial classifications will be examined
closely to root out invidious discrimination. Indeed, the Court
had already made that lesson clear. In McLaughlin v.
Florida,"' there was no showing that the state was trying to
promote the superiority of one race over another, and the Court
nonetheless struck down the statute expressly classifying on
the basis of race." The McLaughlin Court made quite clear
that "Uludicial inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause ...
does not end with a showing of equal application among the
members of the class defined by the legislation. " "' Rather, the
"courts must reach and determine the question whether the
classifications drawn in a statute are reasonable in light of its
purpose.."7
The claim here is not that marriage statutes that
expressly classify on the basis of sex will be treated in the same
way as will statutes that expressly classify on the basis of race.
160 For a discussion of some of the important interests implicated in marriage
that would be denied to same-sex couples were they denied the right to marry, see
supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
16' Cf. Croson, 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Sitrict scrutiny must
be applied to all governmental classification by race, whether or not its asserted
purpose is 'remedial' or 'benign.'").
162 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 n.ll (1967) ("[We find the racial
classifications in these statutes repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, even
assuming an even-handed purpose to protect the 'integrity' of all races.").
163 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S 200, 227 (1995).
164 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
16 See id. at 196.
166 See id. at 191.
167 See id.
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The former classifications are subjected to a lower level of
scrutiny than are the latter."' Nonetheless, the claims are that
sex-based classifications should not be subjected to a rational
basis test and that, as Justice Scalia himself acknowledges in
his Lawrence dissent, same-sex marriage bans involve sex-
based classifications."9
Perhaps the Court will ultimately find that same-sex
marriage bans pass constitutional muster. However, unless the
Court is going to modify its current jurisprudence,'70 Justice
Scalia is incorrect that a statute disadvantaging same-sex
couples and expressly classifying on the basis of sex does "not
need to be justified by anything more than a rational basis,
which ... is satisfied by the enforcement of traditional notions
of sexual morality."'7 ' Rather than pass the rational basis test,
which merely requires that the "classification drawn by the
statute [be] rationally related to a legitimate state interest,'72
such a classification must serve "important governmental
objectives and . . . the discriminatory means employed . . .
[must be] substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives.' 73
To establish the constitutionality of a sex-based
classification, it will not suffice merely to establish that the
classification was not motivated out of animus towards one sex
or the other. As the Court made clear in United States v.
Virginia,'7' "a party seeking to uphold government action based
on sex must establish an 'exceedingly persuasive justification'
for the classification."'73 Indeed, the classification at issue in
,68 But see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 596 (1996) (Scalia, J,
dissenting) (suggesting that the majority had offered "a redefinition of intermediate
scrutiny that makes it indistinguishable from strict scrutiny").
'69 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
'"0 In order for the Court to uphold the constitutionality of same-sex marriage
bans, it will have to modify current constitutional jurisprudence in a number of
respects. See generally MARK STRASSER, ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS, AND
THE RULE OF LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AT THE CROSSROADS (2002).
'.' Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2496 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112 See id. at 2484 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
113 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (quoting Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)) (internal quotes omitted).
174 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
175 Id. at 524 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724).
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Virginia, which arguably was not motivated by animus, '
nonetheless failed to pass constitutional muster. 171
It is unclear whether same-sex marriage bans could
survive heightened scrutiny. However, in Baker v. Vermont '8
the Vermont Supreme Court employed something less than
heightened scrutiny19 and nonetheless held that the state
constitution's equal protection analog'80 prevented the state
from refusing to accord qualifying same-sex couples the
benefits accorded to married couples.' By the same token, in
Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health,'82 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts struck down that state's same-sex
marriage ban using a possibly heightened rational basis test.'83
While these are state supreme courts interpreting their own
constitutions, their striking down the statutes under
heightened rational basis tests makes it seem at best unlikely
that same-sex marriage bans could withstand heightened
scrutiny.
IV. WHY DOES LAWRENCE "INVOLVE" SAME-SEX MARRIAGE?
In his Lawrence dissent, Justice Scalia suggests that the
majority opinion "'does not involve' homosexual marriage only
if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have
nothing to do with the decisions of this Court."' It is worth
thinking about why Justice Scalia believes that Lawrence
"involves" same-sex marriage when the Texas statute
116 See id. at 580 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "claim that VMI has
elected to maintain its all-male student-body composition for some misogynistic reason"
has been utterly refuted).
'.. Id. at 558.
178 744 A.2d 864 (1999).
179 See id. at 880 n.13 (suggesting that heightened scrutiny would be more
difficult to withstand than the scrutiny applied).
180 The Common Benefits Clause in the Vermont Constitution is the analog of
the Equal Protection Clause in the United States Constitution. See id. at 870.
'8' See id. at 889.
182 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
1'3 See id. at 961 ("[W]e conclude that the marriage ban does not meet the
rational basis test for either due process or equal protection."); id. at 959 ("The
Massachusetts Constitution protects matters of personal liberty against government
incursion as zealously, and often more so, than does the Federal Constitution.").
184 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2498 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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challenged was Section 21.06(a) of the Texas Penal Code'8'
rather than Section 2.001 of the Texas Family Code."
A. Lawrence and the Pre-existing Priorities in Due Process
Jurisprudence
Lawrence is important to consider for a number of
reasons. It strikes down sodomy laws generally, which not only
precludes states from criminalizing adult, voluntary, same-sex
relations but also has important implications if the Court is
going to adhere to the priorities that it has already articulated
as being important in substantive due process jurisprudence.
The Court has already made clear that relationships are
privileged over relations and that family matters are at the
core of what due process protects.18 If the Constitution protects
the right to engage in non-marital sexual relations regardless
of the respective sexes of the participants, then it certainly also
protects family relationships from state impingement,
regardless of whether the family is made up of members of the
LGBT community. This protection not only extends to one's
children but to one's life partner as well. If the previous
jurisprudence is not suddenly going to undergo transformation,
then Lawrence suggests that substantive due process protects
the right to marry a same-sex partner.
B. Lawrence as Representing an Evolution in Attitude
As a separate but related point, Lawrence represents a
significant change in tone. Romer v. Evans1" was an
improvement over Bowers because Romer struck down an
amendment that disfavorably classified those with a same-sex
orientation "not to further a proper legislative end but to make
them unequal to everyone else."' The Romer Court made clear
that it "is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws
of this sort."'"
1"5 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003). This is the statute that
criminalized certain sexual relations between members of the same sex.
186 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001 (Vernon 2003). This is the statute which
precludes same-sex couples from getting married.
117 See supra notes 93-131 and accompanying text.
188 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
..9 Id. at 635.
" Id. at 633.
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Yet Romer was ambiguous in that it was difficult to
determine whether the amendment was unconstitutional
precisely because "its sheer breadth [was] so discontinuous
with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seem[ed]
inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it
affect[ed] ..' Were that the amendment's fatal flaw, then one
might expect that the electorate could have achieved a similar
result if only it had been more patient and had adopted a
piecemeal approach rather than tried to do everything in one
fell swoop.'92 If that was all that Romer stood for, then it would
not be particularly supportive of the LGBT community except,
perhaps, as a statement that it is impermissible for the state to
make members of the LGBT community into pariahs. 3
Lawrence does not lend itself to the same kind of
minimalist interpretation. While the Court is mysterious about
what it will say with respect to the constitutionality of same-
sex marriage bans, its tone of acceptance of and respect for
members of the LGBT community seems hard to mistake. That
change in tone is important if only because it indicates that the
Court no longer believes that LGBT individuals are second-
class citizens deserving less protection than others.
C. Lawrence as Laying Bare the Invidiousness of Bowers
The Lawrence Court implied that Bowers had invidious
effects." Yet the Lawrence dissent suggests something much
stronger. Apparently, some members of the Court have taken
Bowers to hold as a matter of law that second-class status may
be imposed upon an entire group because of moral disapproval
of that group."5 This casts a whole new light on the majority
and dissenting opinions in Bowers, Romer, and Lawrence.
In his Bowers dissent, Justice Blackmun suggested,
"Unlike the Court, the Georgia Legislature has not proceeded
on the assumption that homosexuals are so different from other
citizens that their lives may be controlled in ways that would
191 Id. at 632.
192 See Lynn A. Baker, The Missing Pages of the Majority Opinion in Romer v.
Evans, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 387, 408 (1997) (suggesting that the piecemeal approach
would be permissible).
193 For this view, see Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle,
13 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 266-70 (1996).
19 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2482 (2003) (holding that continuing
Bowers "as precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons").
195 See infra notes 196-242 and accompanying text.
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not be tolerated if it limited the choices of those other
citizens."" One might have thought that Justice Blackmun was
engaging in rhetorical exaggeration. While the Bowers Court
had held that same-sex sodomy did not implicate a right deeply
rooted in the nation's history and tradition and hence was not
protected by the Due Process Clause, the same analysis applied
equally to different-sex sodomy '97 as well as to adultery,
fornication, and a host of other activities. '98 Thus, the decision,
although disappointing and arguably wrong, 9 need not have
been doing anything invidious.
Certainly, lack of invidiousness does not excuse the
Court's having offered a cramped"3 and willfully blind °1 reading
of the case, the issue before it, and the past jurisprudence,
thereby creating an arbitrary limit on the reach of substantive
due process guarantees that undercut the nation's long-
cherished values."' Nonetheless, such a result, although deeply
regrettable, is hardly the equivalent of a holding that those
with a same-sex orientation can be singled out for disfavorable
treatment."'
Yet, Justice Blackmun may not have been engaging in
rhetorical exuberance after all. To see that, it is important to
consider Romer and then Lawrence. Romer might seem to be a
surprising case to discuss when seeking to get at the "proper"
interpretation of Bowers. At issue in Romer was an amendment
to the Colorado Constitution (Amendment 2) that precluded
16 See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 200 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
197 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2479 (suggesting that the longstanding
prohibitions of sodomy could be explained in terms of a disapproval of nonprocreative
acts).
198 See id. at 2496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the rationale
supporting sodomy statutes also supported a host of other statutes including those
prohibiting fornication and adultery).
199 See id. at 2478 (suggesting that Bowers was wrongly decided at the time
the decision was handed down).
200 See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 202-03 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing the
Court's "cramped reading").
"' See id. at 201-02, 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court
was willfully blinding itself to the issue before it).
202 Cf. id. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[D]epriving individuals of the
right to choose for themselves how to conduct their intimate relationships poses a far
greater threat to the values most deeply rooted in our Nation's history than tolerance
of nonconformity could ever do.").
293 Apparently, Justice Scalia reads Bowers to have held this. See Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 618, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("In holding that homosexuality
cannot be singled out for disfavorable treatment, the Court contradicts a decision ...
pronounced only 10 years ago [namely Bowers].").
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gays, lesbians and bisexuals from receiving protected status.
The Colorado Supreme Court had struck down the amendment
on electoral process grounds,"°5 and the Romer Court affirmed
but on a different ground," namely, that the amendment
violated equal protection guarantees."7 Of interest here is not
whether the amendment should have been struck down as a
violation of equal protection or electoral process guarantees 0
but, rather, why Justice Scalia argued that the case "most
relevant" to the issue before the Romer Court was Bowers. 2
After all, as Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, Colorado had
repealed its sodomy law."0 Yet, according to Justice Scalia, the
fact of the repeal was irrelevant, since if "it is constitutionally
permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal,
surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact
other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct."2 . What
kind of laws? Those precluding the extension of protected
status or, presumably, those precluding marriage. '
To see how breathtaking this view is, consider adultery,
a practice that is likely not protected even after Lawrence.2'
Consider further that, unlike its action with respect to sodomy,
the Colorado Legislature has not repealed its statute
prohibiting adultery."4 One would expect that Justice Scalia
204 The amendment read:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments,
nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school
districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
... See id. at 625-26.
206 Id. at 626.
207 Id. at 635.
208 For a discussion of why the electoral process analysis was an eminently
sensible approach, see generally Mark Strasser, From Colorado to Alaska by Way of
Cincinnati: On Romer, Equality Foundation, and the Constitutionality of Referenda, 36
HOUS. L. REV. 1193 (1999).
209 Romer, 517 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
210 Id. at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Colorado not only is one of the 25 States
that have repealed their antisodomy laws, but was among the first to do so.").
211 Id. at 641.
212 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2498 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that by overruling Bowers, the Lawrence Court makes it impossible to
constitutionally justify same sex marriage bans).
213 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
214 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-501 (2003).
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would suggest that heavy civil penalties could be imposed on
adulterers or even on those who had an adulterous
"orientation,"2 5 such as those married individuals who would
kiss or embrace a non-spouse or, perhaps, who had a "tendency
or desire to do so.'16 An individual burdened by such a statute
might bring an as-applied challenge to establish that he or she
had never engaged in adulterous behavior but the statute
itself, allegedly, would pass constitutional muster."7
Let us focus on a particular possible civil penalty,
namely, not being able to marry. Not so long ago, adulterers
were precluded from marrying their paramours2"'  or,
sometimes, marrying at all.219 Yet very few if any jurists and
commentators in this day and age would suggest that a state
could constitutionally preclude adulterers, much less those
with an adulterous orientation, from remarrying. After all, the
Zablocki Court struck down the Wisconsin statute at issue
precisely because it absolutely prevented some from marrying
and in effect coerced others into forgoing their right to marry.
22
Yet Justice Scalia's Romer and Bowers analyses would imply
that adulterers could be precluded from marrying or
remarrying.
Suppose that we apply Justice Scalia's approach to the
class of fornicators and those who have an "orientation" to
fornicate. Presumably, Justice Scalia would suggest that states
have the power to preclude fornicators from marrying.22' Those
with such an orientation would be allowed to marry if
successful in their as-applied challenge, that is, if they could
establish that they had not in fact fornicated, but the statute
itself could withstand constitutional scrutiny. Basically, this
statute would impose possibly severe.2 penalties on those
212 For Justice Scalia's discussion of those with a same-sex orientation, see
Romer, 517 U.S. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
216 See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217 See id. at 643 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
218 See In re Estate of Lenherr, 314 A.2d 255, 257 (Pa. 1974) (discussing
Pennsylvania law prohibiting adulterers from marrying their paramours during the
life of the innocent ex-spouse).
219 See Chirelstein v. Chirelstein, 79 A.2d 884, 890 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1951) (discussing New York law precluding adulterers from remarrying while the
innocent ex-spouse was still alive).
220 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
21 For an example of a fornication statute, see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344
(Michie 2003) (classifying fornication as a Class 4 misdemeanor). Presumably, such a
statute is unenforceable after Lawrence. See text accompanying supra note 53.
222 Those uninterested in marrying might not consider this a severe penalty.
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unwilling to delay having sexual relations until after marriage,
and Justice Scalia would suggest that such matters are best
left to the wisdom of the legislature.
Consider how the Lawrence dissenters might address a
hypothetical case, Rablocki v. Zedhail, involving facts similar
to those of Zablocki. Justice Scalia would point out that Zedhail
had fathered a child out of wedlock.23 He would note that while
Wisconsin does not have a law against fornication per se,22 it
could have such a law without offending the Constitution,
because fornication is neither implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty nor a right that is deeply rooted in the nation's history
and tradition. Justice Scalia would further point out that in
Wisconsin the failure to pay child support can result in a felony
conviction.225  He would then suggest that if "it is
constitutionally permissible for a State to make . . .conduct
[involving nonsupport] criminal, then surely it is
constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws
merely disfavoring .. .conduct [involving nonsupport] .226 He
would conclude that Wisconsin could preclude Zedhail from
marrying, past jurisprudence to the contrary notwithstanding.
Justice Rehnquist would either join Justice Scalia's opinion or
would write a separate one suggesting that the right to marry
is not the sort of right that invariably triggers strict scrutiny.2 27
Justice Thomas might join either of those opinions or, perhaps,
write his own in which he not only rejected the fundamental
right to marry but also the general right to privacy.2
These views contradict the current right-to-marry
jurisprudence, although that jurisprudence does not require
the Court to strike down any and all restrictions on marriage.
As the Court made clear in Zablocki, "reasonable regulations
that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into
the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed."29 For
example, in Sosna v. Iowa,3' the Court upheld Iowa's one-year
223 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 377-78.
224 The state does have a law against public fornication. See WIs. STAT. §
944.15 (2003).
225 See WIs. STAT. § 948.22 (2003) (specifying conditions under which failure to
pay child support is a felony).
226 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
227 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
228 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2498 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
229 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
230 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
2004]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
residency requirement for divorce."l However, that was
precisely because the statute at issue did not deprive the
appellant of the right to marry but merely delayed its
exercise."s Here, we are postulating a complete deprivation of
the right to marry. The current due process jurisprudence
simply does not permit the deprivation of that right unless the
statute at issue "is supported by sufficiently important state
interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests .,,233
There are two distinct issues that must not be conflated.
One involves the refusal of the Lawrence dissenters to accept or
apply current privacy or right-to-marry jurisprudence. Another
involves their apparent belief that Bowers permits same-sex
marriage bans in particular because, allegedly, Bowers stands
for the proposition that those with a same-sex orientation can
be singled out for disfavorable treatment," notwithstanding
the explicit disavowal in Bowers that equal protection issues
were even being addressed.'
It should be little wonder that Justice Scalia suggested
in his Romer dissent that the challenged amendment was
merely "a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to
preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a
politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use
of the laws."23  On his view, Bowers established that it was
permissible for the states to impose any of a number of
disabilities on members of the LGBT community, and Colorado
had not chosen to exercise that power as fully as it might have.
When the Romer Court wrote that a state cannot "deem
a class of persons a stranger to its laws , ".237 it was rejecting a
view that the Lawrence and Romer dissenters actually seem to
hold, namely, that Bowers permits a kind of open season on
231 See id. at 410.
232 See id.
233 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388.
23 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
235 See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 196 n.8 (1986) ("Respondent does not defend the
judgment below based on the Ninth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, or the
Eighth Amendment."). See also Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2486 (2003) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("The only question in front of the Court in Bowers was whether the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause protected a right to engage in
homosexual sodomy. Bowers did not hold that moral disapproval of a group is a
rational basis under the Equal Protection Clause to criminalize homosexual sodomy
when heterosexual sodomy is not punished.") (citation omitted).
236 Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 635-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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members of the LGBT community.38 The Romer and Lawrence
dissenters should be commended for their forthrightness. They
do not merely suggest with a wink and a nod that a neutral law
might slyly be applied in a way that would disadvantage a
particular group without running afoul of Yick Wo
limitations."3' Rather the Romer dissent boldly argues that
Bowers permits members of the LGBT community to be singled
out for disfavorable treatment and the Lawrence dissent
implies that discrimination against the LGBT community in
particular is legitimate and a constitutional right.24° Rather
than engaging in rhetorical exaggeration, the Bowers dissents
and the Romer and Lawrence majority decisions almost
understate the view that they are opposing. If that opposing
view is not invidious, it seems difficult to imagine what would
qualify.
D. Lawrence and Same-Sex Marriage
Even before Lawrence, the constitutionally significant
interests established in the right-to marry jurisprudence were
equally applicable to same-sex and different-sex couples. Both
types of couples may have children to raise and may consider
marriage as an expression of emotional support, public
commitment, and religious faith. Some commentators would
explain the apparent anomaly in the failure to recognize the
unconstitutionality of same-sex marriage bans by talking about
a "gay exception,"' while others would simply claim that this is
a refusal to accord same-sex couples "special rights."4 Justice
Scalia helps to settle that debate in his Romer and Lawrence
dissents, where he suggests that same-sex marriages are
constitutionally protected not if members of the LGBT
238 See Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Philosophical Gulf on the Rehnquist Court, 29RUTGERs L.J. 1, 16 (1997) (reading Romer as saying that open season on the LGBT
community is unsupportable).
239 See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2487 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing
limitations of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), on the application of facially
neutral laws).
240 See id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
241 See Paula L. Ettlebrick, Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and GayFamily Recognition, 5 J.L. & POLY 107, 162 (1996) (discussing a "gay exception to
family law rules").
242 Cf. Lino A. Graglia, Judicial Review: Wrong in Principle, A Disaster in
Practice, 21 Miss. C. L. REV. 243, 249 (2002) ("The Court has recently overturned the
decision by the people of Colorado made by referendum to preclude the grant of special
rights to homosexuals.").
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community are accorded special rights, but simply if they are
accorded the same rights as everyone else. Apparently, Justice
Scalia's complaint is that by overruling Bowers and thereby
making clear that the LGBT community cannot be singled out
for disfavorable treatment, the Lawrence Court makes it
impossible to offer a constitutionally viable argument justifying
same-sex marriage bans. Of course, neither the Lawrence
majority nor the Lawrence concurrence believes that the
Constitution permits states to create the kind of second-class
citizenship that three members of the Court apparently believe
would pass constitutional muster, and it remains to be seen
what implications, if any, this newly announced equality will
have.
V. CONCLUSION
Lawrence is important for a number of reasons. It
suggests that adult, consensual, non-marital relations are
protected by the Due Process Clause. It also suggests that tests
turning on history and tradition and the concept of ordered
liberty should not be used to determine what the Due Process
Clause protects. The decision adopts a much more respectful
tone towards members of the LGBT community and may
provide the basis for someday recognizing a right to marry a
same-sex partner.
The Lawrence majority recognized that "times can blind
us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws
once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to
oppress."243 It is simply unclear whether the current Court can
recognize what Justice Scalia and two other members of the
Court admit - the current equal protection and due process
guarantees require the recognition of same-sex marriage. We
shall simply have to wait and see how many generations of
Supreme Court Justices are required before the Court can see
that same-sex marriage bans are neither necessary nor proper
but in fact serve only to oppress.
243 Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484.
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